We consider estimation of the economic model of crime exploiting instrumental variables techniques for panel data. We extend the empirical analysis of Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) and show that their instrumental variables are very weak. We propose an alternative identi…cation strategy based on the sequential moment conditions of Arellano and Bond (1991) . The resulting GMM estimates of deterrence e¤ects on crime are considerably more precise.
Introduction
Since Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) a huge empirical literature emerged analyzing the causal relationship between deterrence measures and crime rates. Central research question is whether more deterrence leads to more safety and less crime. Deterrence is often measured by probability of apprehension (conviction, sentenced), severity of punishment and number of police o¢ cers. Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) , hereafter CT94, estimate an economic model of crime using annual panel data for 90 counties in North Carolina spanning the period [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] . In their empirical analysis they consider two main speci…cation issues. First, unobserved heterogeneity in crime may be correlated with criminal justice variables leading to omitted variables bias. Therefore, they propose to estimate panel data speci…cations including …xed county and year e¤ects. Second, the level of deterrence is higher in regions with relatively more crime, possibly leading to simultaneity bias. Therefore, they estimate their panel data speci…cation with instrumental variables (IV) techniques.
CT94 is one of the many empirical crime studies relying on external instrumental variables. The validity, i.e. relevance and exogeneity, of those instruments can be questioned (Murray, 2006) . CT94 note that their …xed e¤ects 2SLS deterrence estimates, as opposed to …xed e¤ects OLS estimates, are no longer signi…cant.
Reason is that standard errors increase radically when applying 2SLS instead of OLS. A substantial e¢ ciency loss when applying IV estimation instead of OLS occurs more often in crime studies. For example, in Levitt (1997) IV standard errors are ten times larger than OLS counterparts. Large standard errors typically arise with weak instruments, see e.g. Bound et al. (1995) , Staiger and Stock (1997) and Stock et al. (2002) . Baltagi (2006) replicates and extends the empirical analysis of CT94. Baltagi (2006) cannot replicate the …xed e¤ects 2SLS estimates of CT94, but his alternative set of estimates results in insigni…cance for not only deterrent variables, but also legal opportunity regressors. Furthermore, consistency of the random e¤ects 2SLS estimator cannot be rejected and this estimator yields plausible and signi…cant deterrence estimates. However, Baltagi (2006) remarks that this result should be treated with care because it is based on the fact that the instrumental variables of CT94 are valid.
In the next section we further supplement the empirical results of CT94 and show that exploiting their external instruments actually leads to underidenti…ca-tion. This explains the large standard errors of their …xed e¤ects 2SLS estimates.
Furthermore, we use an alternative identi…cation strategy based on the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator, which exploits lagged values of endogenous variables as instruments. The use of these internal instrumental variables is relatively scarce in empirical crime studies (for exceptions see Witt et al., 1999, and Kelaher and Sara…dis, 2011) , but greatly enhances the precision of the deterrence estimates, as we shall see.
Empirical results
CT94 estimate the following …xed e¤ects panel data model by OLS and IV:
where i denotes county, t is year, R it is the (total) crime rate, X it is a set of control variables and P it contains a set of deterrent variables. The dimensions of the panel data are T = 7 years and N = 90 counties. Included in X it are wages, population density, some demographic variables, year e¤ects and the number of police per capita (P OLICE). The latter is included as a measure of a county's ability to detect crime. Included in P it are the ratio of arrests to o¤enses (P A ), the ratio of convictions to arrests (P C ), the proportion of convictions resulting in imprisonment (P P ), and average prison sentence length in days (S). Furthermore, i are …xed county e¤ects and " it are idiosyncratic errors. A double log functional form has been adopted, hence coe¢ cients are elasticities.
<Table 1 about here> Column 1 of Table 1 replicates the Within OLS estimates of CT94. 1 The magnitude of the deterrence e¤ects of P A , P C and P P is ordered according to the economic model of crime. Contrary to other research (Levitt, 1997 (Levitt, , 2002 Worrall and Kovandzic, 2010) police has positive correlation with crime. CT94 give as explanation that more police report more crime. An alternative explanation is that here the contemporaneous e¤ect is included, while elsewhere often P OLICE only appears with a lag.
CT94 assume endogeneity of two regressors, i.e. probability of arrest (P A ) and size of police force (P OLICE). Two external instrumental variables are used, i.e. o¤ense mix and per capita tax revenues. The o¤ense mix is the ratio of crimes involving "face-to-face" contact (such as robbery, assault and rape) to those that do not. Column (2) of Table 1 replicates the Within 2SLS estimates as reported by Baltagi (2006) . The standard errors of the Within 2SLS estimates are many times larger than their OLS counterparts suggesting an identi…cation problem. The Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank statistic indeed does not reject the null hypothesis of reduced rank of the matrix of reduced form parameters. Therefore, the rank condition for identi…cation is not satis…ed.
IV estimation of the Within model can only be used when the instruments are strongly exogenous. An alternative transformation, which allows for predetermined instruments, is taking …rst di¤erences. Column (3) of Table 1 internal instruments for the model in …rst di¤erences (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981) .
Column (4) of Table 1 reports FD IV estimates using two period lagged values of P A and P OLICE as instruments. Here the Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rank test does reject the null hypothesis of underidenti…cation. Reported standard errors show much higher precision resulting from using these internal instruments.
More e¢ cient IV estimation is possible by considering more lagged values, exploiting the fact that each time period o¤ers additional moment conditions.
Column (5) of Table 1 reports FD IV estimates using two period lagged values of P A and P OLICE as instruments, but now separately for each time period.
In other words, we use ten instruments for two endogenous regressors. (29).
Compared with the IV estimates of Table 1 , further e¢ ciency gains can be achieved by considering GMM estimation (Arellano and Bond, 1991) . The FD IV estimates in Table 1 do not exploit the fact that the errors of the …rst di¤erenced model are serially correlated and potentially heteroscedastic.
<Table 2 about here>
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 reports two-step GMM estimates 3 corresponding with the IV estimates from columns (5) and (6) The use of lagged internal instruments instead of external instrumental variables seems a viable alternative empirical strategy to identify deterrence e¤ects in the CT94 data. Their validity, however, is crucially depending on absence of serial correlation in the idiosyncratic errors. In other words, in the …rst differenced model no higher-order residual autocorrelation should occur. Although Hansen (1982) p-values indicate that the exploited moment conditions are valid, the Arellano-Bond (1991) second-order residual autocorrelation test has a relatively low p-value. Therefore, in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 we report estimation results of a dynamic model including one period lagged values for all three (R, P A and P OLICE) endogenous variables as additional regressors. Columns (3) and (4) 
Concluding remarks
We have estimated the economic model of crime exploiting instrumental variables techniques for panel data. We extend the empirical analysis of CT94 and show that their external instrumental variables are very weak, which explains their imprecise IV deterrence estimates. We propose an alternative identi…cation strategy based on lagged internal instruments, and apply GMM instead of IV. The resulting internal instruments are valid and reasonably strong. In magnitude coe¢ cient estimates are in line with earlier results. However, both exploiting internal instruments and applying GMM instead of IV yields considerably more precise estimates of the deterrence e¤ects on crime. It is interesting to investigate the e¤ectiveness of this alternative identi…cation strategy in other empirical crime studies too, even when strong external instruments are available. The use of strong internal and external instruments enables the researcher to test the validity of both types separately, resulting in improved credence of instrumental variables analyses. 
